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Relation of Client and Accountant *
By Frederick H. Hurdman
The subject which has been assigned to me for discussion this
afternoon covers a very wide field, and I feel constrained to
confine whatever observations I have to make to some of the
more important phases of the question.
There can be no disputing the fact that in relations with clients
the accountant should maintain his independence, and yet some
of our best clients are those who depend upon us to a very large
extent for guidance in the conduct of their businesses. It
requires a very fine sense of balance at all times to preserve that
independence and still maintain the closest of business and,
perhaps, social relationships.
The same degree of impartiality does not seem to be required
in the legal profession where the lawyer is expected to serve and
protect the interest of his client generally to the exclusion of every
other interest. The accountant, on the other hand, is expected
to deal with the facts as he finds them even though a revelation of
those facts may appear to be detrimental to his clients’ interests.
One thing is certain, however: the accountant must be careful
to guard against putting himself in a position where he has
difficulty in applying an independent and unbiased judgment to
any problem which may be presented to him for consideration.
It will be my purpose to discuss some of the points of danger
which, it occurs to me, lie in the path of the unwary accountant.
I take it we are not so much concerned about the conduct of our
clients as we are about our own, but in the course of this paper I
may have occasion to refer inferentially at least to some of the
shortcomings of clients.
Let us assume that an accountant is asked to call upon some
previously unknown person for the purpose of an interview re
garding a prospective accounting engagement. He finds that
he has been recommended by a client, a business acquaintance of
the man who is to be interviewed. After discussing the nature
of the work to be performed and possibly the basis for charge, it
would be wise to inquire whether or not any other firm of ac
countants had served this concern. Should it be found that
another accountant numbers this concern among his clients,
*Address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, Philadel
phia, Pennsylvania, September 16, 1931.
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future relations, should they materialize, will best be served by a
frank statement to the effect that the accountant in question is a
reputable practitioner, in good standing in the profession, and
that one prefers to withdraw from any consideration of this en
gagement so long as a fellow accountant is retained as auditor.
This attitude, besides preserving self-respect, will immediately
place one in the proper relation should it appear that for good
reasons the existing arrangement has been or is in process of being
terminated.
By this act one will have not only established independence at
the start, but also have placed future relations with the client on
a professional rather than a business basis. He is not likely to
forget quickly the impression made at this first conference.
Many firms make it a practice to communicate with the super
seded firm in order that there may be no question concerning the
propriety of accepting the new engagement.
Should it appear that the reason why the former arrangement
is being terminated is that the accountant refused to concur in
some statement which one would hesitate himself to subscribe,
that information would be of great value in that it would enable
one to establish a definite understanding with the client at the
beginning concerning one’s own views on this point. The tempta
tion may be great to pick some flaw in the previous accountant’s
argument and thereby find a way to ingratiate one’s self with the
prospective client. However, if one values his self-respect it
behooves him to make certain that the position he takes is sound,
and an application of the golden rule at this point may be de
cidedly in order.
When it becomes apparent that the fee for the proposed engage
ment is a major consideration in eligibility, the accountant must
be wary indeed lest he find himself in the position of a competitor
bidding against a thoroughly reputable firm for an engagement
which, if obtained, may be lost next year for the simple reason
that someone else has bid lower. In such circumstances, if one
feels that he must submit a fee, he should do so only after careful
appraisal of the work to be done and consultation with the present
auditors, and he should always submit a figure in excess of the
fee now being paid. If all practising accountants could be per
suaded to follow this procedure the subject of competitive bidding
would be a thing of the past and both the accountant and client
would benefit.
298

Relation of Client and Accountant
Having secured the engagement one must be careful not to
permit the client to go too far in laying out the course. Having
ascertained from him what is wanted in the way of results, it is
largely up to the accountant to determine the amount of work to
be done in order to produce that result. Generally one can dis
courage a client who wishes to direct the scope of audit by point
ing out to him what in one’s opinion is necessary to be done and
stating the qualifications one will be required to make in the
certificate or report if one’s plan for the audit is not followed.
The accountant and not the client is the one who must sign the
certificate and be held responsible for the character and thorough
ness of the audit.
In the course of audit one will find it necessary to discuss with
the client certain points whereon to take issue as to the correct
ness of the conclusions expressed in the books of account. A
restatement of the accounts in a way approved by the accountant
may have the effect of producing a more favorable or unfavorable
picture of the business or its operations.
Only one consideration need worry the accountant, that is,
the soundness of his reasoning with relation to the problem in
volved. If the result produced by interpretation of the accounts
be unfavorable the accountant may meet with hearty concur
rence in his views on the part of the management. However,
the reverse is more apt to be the case and the accountant will be
called upon vigorously to defend his reasoning. If the point
involved is not one clearly defined by good accounting practice,
one may be confronted with quotations from sundry authors of
books or articles on accounting to prove that a contrary view is
tenable. These are very difficult times for the accountant. To
hold firmly to his views may mean the loss of a client. It is im
portant to be right. If one is sure of his position he can be as
firm as the rock of Gibraltar with the knowledge that in most cases
he will not only not lose a client but will make a more lasting one.
I presume there are few accountants who have developed success
ful practices who can not recall with satisfaction relations with
clients which promised disaster at one time but, because the ac
countant was right and the client wrong, developed into a com
plete success.
One must be very wary of expedients in the settlement of
differences. In other words, one must not compromise his repu
tation as a trustworthy and capable accountant. Ways will be
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suggested and may very well suggest themselves whereby one
may think to relieve himself of responsibility by the manner in
which the point under dispute is expressed. In other words, the
client wins his point and the accountant’s honor is “preserved”
by a set of carefully chosen words. I use the word “preserved”
advisedly, because that is usually what happens to one’s honor;
it ceases to develop and becomes a museum piece, good for little
else than as a thing to remember. The accountant who yields
may find himself called upon frequently thereafter to repeat this
performance and may even discover that he is suggesting ways in
which the real facts may be obscured.
In a recent celebrated case in the English courts the attorney
general stated that the jury would be the more irresistibly
driven to the conclusion that the statements in question were
intended to deceive someone if they also thought that very care
fully prepared phrases were made and used which would allay
any suspicion or uneasiness in the minds of the ordinary prudent
investor and would conceal from him the true position—phrases
so carefully constructed as to enable the defendants to say that
the words they used covered what they did. If the jury thought
that carefully prepared phrases would prevent the ordinary
man’s understanding what was being done, then the fact that the
phrases were constructed in the way he had indicated, in his sub
mission, forced them to come to the conclusion that there was an
intention to deceive.
What has been said about the manner in which an engagement
has been secured, the negotiations concerning the fee, the scope
of the audit programme and the client’s relations with other ac
countants may have a very important bearing on the adjustments
of differences in points of view or treatment of accounting ques
tions as they arise from time to time.
If the client finds that the accountant is endeavoring to conduct
himself on a high ethical plane in a distinctly professional way, and
that the fee involved is incidental rather than the primary factor in
the relationship, the client will exhibit a greater degree of respect
for the accountant’s views. In other words, through the steps
mentioned he will recognize all of the attributes of a professional
man. It will then be possible for the accountant, by good judg
ment and tact, to impress upon him his ability as an accountant.
Another important factor to be kept in mind is independence.
The accountant must be free to state what he believes to be the
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facts. This suggests the undesirability of any dual relationships,
such as acting as auditor and at the same time holding any
position of direct relationship to the client such as a fiduciary office
or as a director, officer and, in some cases, even as a stockholder
of the corporation audited.
Generally speaking, an accountant should not accept appoint
ment as a director or officer of a corporation whose books and
accounts he audits unless the stock of that corporation be pri
vately owned by a limited number of persons and the public,
generally, is not affected thereby. Such a corporation might be
one organized by a person to control his own estate or one organ
ized by a small group to manage a real-estate venture.
It is difficult to see wherein the relationship is improved by
having the auditor also act as a director. If the accountant’s
judgment is desired, surely it can be obtained when required,
even by attendance at directors’ meetings if necessary. It is
feared that too often the promoters desire the name of the ac
countant on the directorate to help bolster the credit and stand
ing of the corporation in the community.
In the very nature of his calling, the accountant should com
mand a position of respect. He is at least presumed to be hon
orable in his relation with the public and to be concerned with
facts regardless of their effect. In such circumstances, the client
may ask, what could have a more favorable effect upon a pro
spective investor than the inclusion of the accountant’s name in
the list of those selected to form the board of directors of a newly
launched enterprise in the community where the accountant is
well and favorably known?
It may transpire that the accountant-director has very little
influence in shaping the policies of the new enterprise. In that
event, at least so far as the investing public is concerned, he may
find himself held equally responsible with his co-directors for acts
which he thoroughly disapproves. While withdrawal from the
board in such circumstances may appear to be a perfectly simple
and logical remedy, nevertheless, considerable damage may ensue
to the reputation of the accountant because of the reliance of
others upon the fact that the accountant was identified with the
management of the company’s affairs, and to some extent they
were influenced in the investment as a result of that knowledge.
Bankers have stated that they look with suspicion upon audited
statements when it appears that the auditor or some member of
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his firm is acting in the capacity of a director or officer of the
concern audited. They have stated that it made some difference
where the reputation of the accountant involved was of such a
high character that they felt reasonably certain the dual relation
ship did not work harmfully. However, in justice to one’s client,
one should be careful not to create the slightest basis for any
suspicion by the banker as to absolute independence.
This underlying feeling of suspicion apparently is not removed
even though the partner in the accounting firm who is acting in
the capacity of director deliberately takes no part in the audit
programme. That view will be understood when it is realized
that the accountant in charge of the audit might hesitate to take
a contrary view of some point arising in the audit, if he knew that
the director-partner had apparently given his approval at a meet
ing of the board. In such a case it is highly probable that ap
proval might have been withheld if the director-partner had had
presented to him the same set of facts as was discovered by the
accountant in his audit. The accountant should not be hampered
by any such restriction of his independence.
Even in the case of a privately owned corporation there may be
circumstances which will cause the auditor’s report to be ex
hibited to the bank, some creditor or third party interested in
investment or purchase. In such a case the preservation of an
independent relationship may be quite important.
In Great Britain the companies act, 1929, provides as follows
under section 133:
None of the following persons shall be qualified for appoint
ment as auditor of a company:
(a) a director or an officer of the company;
(b) except where the company is a private company, a person
who is a partner of or in the employment of an officer of
the company;
(c) a body corporate.

The principle behind these provisions is to ensure the inde
pendence and personal responsibility of the auditor. Paragraphs
“b” and "c” appeared for the first time in the companies act,
1929. Under the 1908 act, the only persons disqualified for ap
pointment as auditors were directors and officers of the company.
I am informed that the exception referred to in the case of a
private company doubtless arises because generally the di
rectors, with their immediate relatives and friends, are the sole
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proprietors and there is no market for the shares. In other words,
the public interest is very limited or practically negligible.
It would seem to me desirable that the Institute express itself
on this point, either by the adoption of a new rule of professional
conduct or by resolution of the membership. If the latter method
be preferred, I would suggest the following preamble and reso
lution :
Whereas the relation between a client in the form of a corpora
tion and the auditor for that corporation should be one of entire
independence, and
Whereas it does not appear to be practicable for the auditor
consistently to hold a dual relationship as auditor and executive
of the corporation, and
Whereas the public interest and confidence will best be pre
served by a complete separation of these two functions, therefore
be it
Resolved that the maintenance of a dual relationship as di
rector or officer of a corporation while acting as auditor of that
corporation is against the best interests of the public and the pro
fession and tends to destroy that independence of action consid
ered essential in the relationship between client and auditor.
The propriety of an auditor’s investing in the stock of com
panies for which he or his firm acts as auditor is a little more
difficult to determine. Generally speaking, it would seem to
follow logically that if he is to maintain that relationship of ab
solute independence he should not become interested in the
stock of those companies for which he is acting as auditor.
It may be argued that the ratio of the auditor’s investment to
the entire amount of stock outstanding would have a bearing,
and that in proportion to the size of this investment one might
expect to be influenced.
At this stage it may be well to inquire what is the ratio, the
amount of the accountant’s investment in relation to total capital
of the corporation or the amount of his investment in this par
ticular stock in relation to his own total investments in all stocks.
As a practical matter it may be unreasonable to expect that the
accountant would be willing to jeopardize his reputation and the
consequent valuable goodwill developed over a period of years for
the profit he might hope to realize as a result of some decision he
was required to make in his audit of a company’s accounts.
Certainly the auditor should not take advantage of knowledge
acquired as auditor, which the public could not obtain, to secure
a more favorable investment for himself. Such opportunities
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might occur in reorganizations, underwritings, new issues, stock
dividends and the like. Great care should be exercised that the
auditor does not place himself in the position of having accepted
a favor from the management by being permitted to share in
some benefit before a like offer is made to the public.
It would appear that while no fixed rule can be laid down, the
accountant should keep in mind the necessity at all times of pre
serving an independent relationship and so arranging his invest
ments that he does not take advantage of the public nor permit
any hoped-for gain in market values to influence in any degree his
impartial review and presentation of the facts.
Numerous other factors entering into this relationship between
client and accountant will present themselves. It will be obvious
that the accountant should be careful about accepting favors from
his client in the way of price reductions on merchandise sold to
him, gratuities to the staff accountants actually engaged upon the
audit or any consideration which might tend to place the ac
countant under obligation to the client.
Of course the accountant should always be a gentleman. This
implies courtesy, tact and firmness. It does not imply that be
cause the client happens to be a boor the accountant should adopt
like characteristics. If it develops that the morals of the client
are objectionable it may well be the part of wisdom to sever rela
tions even though at some pecuniary loss. An immoral client
may be a costly one in the long run.
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